

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR  
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. RGHM-375

**SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Base, Bonn

DATE

Att: ☐ Chief, EE

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany

SUBJECT ☐ GENERAL Operational/CASE/Liaison  
☐ SPECIFIC CARPENTER Trip to United States

**DESENSITIZED**

REF DOI 70-17

Synopsis: This dispatch is a summary of CARPENTER's activities in the United States for the period 31 May - 25 June 1950. The major portion of the dispatch is devoted to the 11 - 25 June period when CARPENTER's program was sponsored by KIBANE.

## 31 May

1. At about 0900 Thursday morning 31 May 1950, CARPENTER arrived at Idlewild Airport where he was met by representatives of KIBANE and ☐ who happened to be in New York on business. CARPENTER's plane, together with several other planes, had been slightly delayed and consequently on his arrival there was a heavy run on customs which, despite his KIBANE escort, resulted in one of CARPENTER's bags being inspected. His clearance thereafter was accomplished without incident.

2. After spending the day in New York, CARPENTER boarded a late afternoon train for Washington which brought him to Union Station at about 2130 where he was met by ☐ having returned to Washington earlier in the day. He was taken to the ☐ house which was to be his residence while in the Washington area.

## 1 June

3. Friday, June 1, CARPENTER spent at the German Embassy and State Department, making preparations for Identity 1's visit to the United States. In the evening, ☐ who was to be one of CARPENTER's escorts while in Washington, stopped for a drink at the ☐ home where ☐ made the introductions. During the course of the evening, ☐ who used the name ☐ explained that he was there to welcome CARPENTER, to outline a tentative program which KIBANE had drawn up for him, and to handle any arrangements which would make CARPENTER's stay in the United States both profitable and pleasant. Referring briefly to CARPENTER's 1949 trip to the United States, CARPENTER stated that he hoped this trip would be

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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more satisfactory. CARPENTIER commented that he realized his arrival last time had been in the wake of the CAUFFIA defection, and he could well understand that U.S. agencies would be chary of a CAUFFIA contact. However, he said, he was anxious to meet people and to discuss cases of mutual interest. He preferred to discuss specifics rather than generalities as he hoped to take back ideas which he might incorporate into his organization. He said he specifically hoped to discuss the [ ] CAUFFIA, [ ] (Herbert [ ]), and FURT/CHURCH cases. (At the time we could not identify the latter case, but CARPENTIER obliged with the details, and an article in Der Spiegel on 2 May provided additional data.)

b. CARPENTIER said that among the broad categories he wished to discuss were: technical aids, personnel problems, legal avenues for prosecution of espionage and subversion cases, and interrelations of government security organizations. CARPENTIER indicated that he felt a need in Germany for closer coordination between the various security services. He remarked that a mutual respect existed between his organization and UPRISING, but that neither he nor WILLIET had any regard for CAUFFIA. [ ] told CARPENTIER that the program set up for him was flexible enough to permit changes and that during the coming week when CARPENTIER was away making arrangements for Identity 1's visit, he (p. church) would revamp the program.

5. During the lighter moments of the evening, CARPENTIER discussed his private life including some of his interests. He said that he is very interested in houses and he and [ ] exchanged notes on various standard and theropitoids presently in Germany during the past six years. CARPENTIER said he rarely bets on a racehorse, although he regards the racetrack and the cemetery as two excellent places to study human nature. He said he likes the island of Igit for vacations, but that this year he is foregoing his vacation as he and Rev. CARPENTIER are expecting a little CARPENTIER sometime in October. He said that he has travelled considerably during the past year, his trips including Moscow, Madrid, and Athens. He commented that on one trip to Moscow, the party had considerable trouble at the Polish border because one passport was not in order -- that of CARPENTIER himself.

2 to 20 June

6. From 2 - 9 June CARPENTIER was in Chicago and Milwaukee where he made the necessary arrangements for Identity 1's visit. While in Chicago, he stopped at Park Forest to visit the family with whom his son will spend the 1946-47 school year. He sampled the beer in Milwaukee and had a complimentary word for the local product. CARPENTIER returned to Washington on the evening of 9 June and the following noon, [ ] joined him at the [ ] for lunch. A sight-seeing trip to St. Francis had been planned, but CARPENTIER said that he had to do some work as a result of his trip to the sub-forest, and that he also wanted to write a few letters to his family and friends. His program for the following two weeks was outlined to him and although he seemed pleased with it, he requested that we cut down some of the planned evening activity as he anticipated being quite tired after his daily briefings (which in fact proved to be the case.)

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11 June

At 09: [ ] picked up CARPENTER at the [ ] house and drove him to the Administration Building for a briefing on RUSAK and its functions by Identity 2. As requested previously by Becker, the briefing was broad in scope with emphasis on RUSAK's relationship to other governmental organizations, and its relative functions and responsibilities. In the first hour Identity 2 spoke in general terms about collection, coordination, and dissemination. As indicated by CARPENTER's subsequent use of terms heard in this briefing, he seemed to have profited considerably from Identity 2's talk. During the coffee break, CARPENTER met Fletcher H. Wright, with whom he held a brief discussion re the CAIRIA case. As a result of this talk, Wright arranged for CARPENTER to see Robert O. Jackson the following day. Other information on CAIRIA which CARPENTER gave to Jackson, Wright, [ ] is well covered in a separate cover W/R to this effect by [ ] who also spoke to CARPENTER on CAIRIA.)

8. During the second hour, Identity 2 presented a breakdown of the IAC and its relationship to the President. CARPENTER seemed most interested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff component and Identity 2 went to considerable lengths to explain its relationship to other components in the IAC, especially to those of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. At no time in his talk did Identity 1 give any data on the general or specific breakdown of RUSAK. CARPENTER later told Jackson that he felt he was given a considerable amount of information by Identity 2, and he apparently overlooked the fact that he received no information on the structure of RUSAK. (Note: It is also possible that CARPENTER was aware of this omission, but deemed any queries in that direction as inappropriate at that time. CARPENTER's tact in asking sensitive questions was noteworthy. Here then once he probed a query with the statement that he believed a question was seldom indicated, but an answer could be.)

9. After lunch at the Whitehouse, CARPENTER and [ ] returned to the Administration Building for a briefing by [ ] (known as [ ] on the Soviet Intelligence Services and their functions and methods of operation. Special attention was given to known operations of the Service as a means of determining differences between SO and RUS operations. The main part of the afternoon was, however, taken up by [ ] with discussion of specific RUS cases. The first case discussed was the plot of [ ]

10. CARPENTER said that lack of proper coordination and withholding of information by all parties concerned were probably the main cause for dissatisfaction with the case. CARPENTER said that the Germans were not brought into the case soon enough, and when they finally were it was almost impossible to be put in touch with an American who was completely informed

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and had authority to act. Certain sources were made too hostile and by persons who did not have official status with German authorities (e.g. GIBS). Also unfortunate, according to CARPENTIER, was the fact that [ ] was in contact at the time the case broke, and consequently initial coordination was not as smooth as it might have been had it been done by someone whom CARPENTIER knew. CARPENTIER said that lacking an evaluation of the sources who were providing the Americans with information, the Germans were understandably justified in their approach to the case. (Note: Over doubts in the evening, CARPENTIER said that had the Americans come to him previously and explained how they received their information, he would have provided the source(s) and at the same time ordered his men to work on [ ] until he broke.) Other cases discussed were Diet GERTEN, Harry ULLMANN, and Josef VERTMEIER. Information which CARPENTIER gave on GERTEN has subsequently been found in the press. Nothing new was added to our knowledge of ULLMANN. However, CARPENTIER said that the German police were using Frau VIERMEIER as a source for information on Diet and his associates, but as she is not a controlled source, the German police do not know how much of her information is accurate or can be trusted.

12. 2000

11. At 1810 [ ] introduced CARPENTIER to Robert O. Aschen in the latter's office in the Administration Building. After an exchange of greetings, CARPENTIER gave a brief review of his organization and the case. Aschen said that he was acquainted with CARPENTIER's work and his organization and asked about the present status of GIBS. CARPENTIER gave essentially the same information contained in [ ] separate cover W/T. Aschen then asked about the present status of Identity J. CARPENTIER replied that he is apparently quite satisfied in West Germany and has an important position in the organization of his post indicated that he was a Communist as a youth, but that his sympathies seemed to have changed as he matured. However, about a year before he defected, investigated indicated that he needed money, and CARPENTIER believes that he may have been recruited at that time. The meeting was concluded at about 1830. Aschen reported that he hoped CARPENTIER's trip was pleasant and profitable and said that if he (Aschen) could aid in any way, CARPENTIER should not hesitate to call on him. CARPENTIER thanked Aschen, said he was well satisfied, and took his leave.

12. [ ] and CARPENTIER proceeded immediately to a briefing in the area including by [ ] on the Satellite Intelligence service. The briefing was informal and consisted of a discussion of radio ops and all specific cases of satellite activities. The following subjects were discussed: KIL, Boris KILIN, ELLI KILIN, Karel VERTER, BRUNO GERTEN, HENRY KILIN (and operations named against it), satellite activity in the Hamburg area, and black border infiltration of satellite agents in West Germany.

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Although the briefing was profitable for CARMICHAEL, it appears that he is not too concerned with the role his organizations must play against satellite operations, this probably being of minor concern to a service which has more immediate and greater problems.

13. After lunch at the Occidental where [ ] and CARMICHAEL discussed German libelings and the culture and activity of Spiesing-Belstein, CARMICHAEL and [ ] returned to the Administration building for a briefing by [ ] on German and its international relations.

14. CARMICHAEL had previously indicated to [ ] that he was interested in Communist spotting and training techniques especially as related to such activity in Detroit-groups. Consequently [ ] devoted considerable time to this subject, and gradually the briefing shifted to an informal question and answer discussion. CARMICHAEL said later that he absorbed a tremendous amount of information from his talks with [ ] when he described as a person from whom they can fly like speech. [ ] incidentally, also gave CARMICHAEL a copy of Billin's Soviet Espionage.

15. June

15. At 0915, [ ] introduced [ ] under his true name to CARMICHAEL at the [ ] home. CARMICHAEL and [ ] then proceeded to the Department of Justice, where they met Mr. Hall, Mr. Foley, Mr. Kennedy, and Mr. Vachels of the Internal Security Division, Attorney General's Office. Hall and Foley withdrew shortly after the introductions, and Vachels and Kennedy proceeded with the briefing. The latter was responsible for most of the morning briefing which covered the organization of the Department of Justice and its relation to the Federal courts, the organization and functions of the Attorney General's Office, especially the Internal Security Division, the Subversive Activities Control Act and Subversive Activities Control Board, and the investigation, prosecution, and presentation of a Communist Party case. Kennedy covered the latter in detail including Constitutional guarantees and other laws which have a direct bearing on CP cases. Wire-tapping and the use of various kinds of intercepts were also discussed. Kennedy said that they serve only as investigative aids; they cannot be used as evidence in court. CARMICHAEL said that wire-tapping is also illegal in Germany but that in this, this may also change. In a later discussion on intercepts, CARMICHAEL implied that in some cases, West German agencies have obtained intercept coverage independent of the allies.

16. During the briefing, CARMICHAEL said that under German law, his office is obliged to prosecute any case of espionage or treason coming to its attention. He has consequently encouraged other West German agencies to consult him informally on such cases so that he may determine if enough evidence has been accumulated to insure conviction. On the subject of persons who are willing to turn State's evidence against their own countrymen, CARMICHAEL said that such persons can expect only a reduction in sentence.

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17. At lunch, the use of LCFIUTTER was discussed. CARPETMAKER indicated that he is not impressed with LCFIUTTER because results can be misleading, West German opinion is opposed to its principle and technique, and furthermore LCFIUTTER results are not permissible in a West German court. After lunch, Kenney showed CARPETMAKER a chart depicting legal action taken by the U.S. government against leaders of the CP, and then WAHRHEIDE gave a thumbnail sketch of the most celebrated treason and espionage cases in American history, concluding with the Rosenberg case. CARPETMAKER was impressed with the relatively few cases brought to court, and stated that in Germany, an individual can be convicted merely if contact with a foreign intelligence service can be proven. Kenney said that the Subversive Activities Control Act gives the U.S. government a new weapon which will enable more prosecutions.

18. CARPETMAKER received the following documents from Kenney and Wahrheide: Organization chart of the Department of Justice, handbook for prospective U.S. citizens (in German), a copy of the Alien Registration Act, and the Internal Security Manual, Provision of Federal Statutes, Executive Orders and Congressional Resolutions Relating to the Internal Security of the United States (Government Printing Office, 83rd Congress, #47). (Note: During the day, [ ] noted that CARPETMAKER showed himself to be a keen student of law. [ ] felt that both Kenney and Wahrheide were surprised at CARPETMAKER's knowledge and understanding of American and Anglo-Saxon law. CARPETMAKER also appeared to be genuinely concerned with the preservation of rights of individuals in the fight against Communism, and although he opposes certain investigative techniques which he believes inhuman and unethical, he clearly favors taking advantage of all legal weapons. CARPETMAKER also spoke highly of his liaison relationship with the ODENVY officer in Bonn. Kenney and Wahrheide offered their continued assistance to CARPETMAKER, and suggested that he use either his KUBARK or ODENVY contacts in Bonn as his channel.)

14 June

19. At 0930, [ ] picked up CARPETMAKER at the [ ] home and escorted him to the State Department Building where they met Mr. Robert N. Margrave and Mr. Arthur Foley of the Munitions Control Board. Margrave is acting chairman of the Military Information Control Committee (MICC) and Foley is the executive secretary. The group proceeded to the Pentagon to the Office of Special Operations headed by retired Marine Corps General Erskine, who is also advisor to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters. Present also were Mr. William Godel, assistant to General Erskine, and Mr. Weaver, apparently a Defense member of MICC.

20. Topics discussed were the safeguarding of military information which the U.S. may release to West Germany under NATO or bilateral agreements, the refugee problems of West Germany, security problems inherent in the return of POWs from the East, liaison problems, the protection of codes and communications,

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and West German activity in the field of electronic countermeasures. Concerning the latter, Erskine mentioned wide-wide Soviet activity in the field of radio-surveillance. CARPENTER said that prior to Identity 1's trip to Moscow, the West Germans had asked the U.S. for assistance and advice, but that no special equipment could be provided. The West Germans consequently had to rely on use of the special railroad car which took them to Moscow for discussion of sensitive matters. Erskine and Godel indicated that the U.S. had underestimated Soviet radio surveillance capabilities. CARPENTER said he had no idea the problem was so serious but that he would discuss it with his superiors immediately upon his return to Germany. He asked for assistance, and Erskine and Godel assured him that the military, at least, would be happy to help. Margrave said that the degree of assistance would require further study and discussion in Washington, and Lumsden suggested that upon CARPENTER's return to Germany, CARPENTER determine what he needed and then submit those requirements to Rusk to serve as a point of departure for future negotiations.

21. After a brief discussion of UNITED and UTILITY, when CARPENTER pointed highly, Margrave, Foley, [ ] and CARPENTER went to lunch. At 1400 the group went to the office of Mr. Cartwright, deputy chief of the Office of Security, Department of State. Nothing of special interest was discussed. The group then went to Mr. Margrave's office where Margrave explained the philosophy of the United States internal security program with emphasis on the clearance procedures for government employees. CARPENTER explained the procedures used by his organization. Candidates are spotted by current employees and generally have had some previous experience in the police field. Candidates who appear to have the necessary qualifications must then submit a PHS. A file check is initiated, but checking is not as complete as that in the U.S. For example, school records, neighbors, and credit references are not checked. The information is evaluated, and if the candidate is accepted, he undergoes a 3 to 6 month probationary period during which his superior closely scrutinizes and assesses him. CARPENTER believes this probationary period is the most important phase of the clearance procedure. He believes that there is no substitute for close personal contact with an employee, and he encourages both personal and professional time in his organization. He himself invites each member of his staff to his home for dinner and conversation at least twice a year. CARPENTER said that CAVANA does not subscribe to his feelings about neighborhood and background checks and that it generally follows the system used in the U.S. CARPENTER remarked that West Germany's system for handling classified information was very primitive and requested any help which might be given him. Margrave promised to supply copies of regulations pertaining to the handling of classified material. (Note: During the day, CARPENTER mentioned that he was still very much interested in the Boris Kopalle, and believed that elements of it were still functioning in West Germany. [ ] brought up the matter of exchanges, referring specifically to the PETERSEN/LAMBERT case. CARPENTER said that in the LAMBERT case, time was of the essence. There were no charges against LAMBERT and he could no longer be held in prison. However, an attempt was made to give the impression that there was a case in the hope that something might be salvaged for the time spent on the case. There was little time to discuss details, and the case abated.)

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15 June

22. In the morning, [ ] escorted CARPENTER to the Treasury Department where they met Mr. Mahan, Deputy Director of the Secret Service. Mahan described in general terms the protection of the President and indicated that he was not at liberty to go into details. CARPENTER asked if Mahan could discuss the qualifications for and training of a Secret Service agent. Mahan complied. CARPENTER was impressed by the high physical and mental standards which the Secret Service sets for its agents. Mahan suggested that the following documents might be useful to CARPENTER: Title 18 of the U.S. Criminal Code, Title 18, 80b (b)(3), chapter 603, second section; the Civil Service Commission publication outlining the qualifications for a Secret Service or Treasury agent. (Note: These documents have been ordered for CARPENTER.) Mahan then escorted CARPENTER and [ ] to the Constable's section, headed by Mr. Grobe, where they received an orientation on the recording and filing of correspondence and saw in exhibit of some of the more classic characteristics of history. [ ] and CARPENTER then departed for a brief sightseeing tour of the Capitol, where they were met by [ ] before going to lunch.

23. After lunch at the Metropole, [ ] took CARPENTER to the Administration Building at 3400, where they met [ ] under his true name, for a briefing on legal restrictions of CI cases. After the usual questions, [ ] discussed the Alien Registration Act and its restrictions in the prosecution of espionage cases. CARPENTER spoke of the difficulties encountered in prosecution of espionage cases in Germany, and then asked [ ] to discuss RIBAK training and recruiting facilities and techniques. [ ] discussed training in general terms and indicated that it is generally geared to the needs of each individual. Concerning recruitment, [ ] said that RIBAK uses various channels to obtain personnel (e.g., special speakers, straight application). CARPENTER remarked that his organization accepts no applications that all employees are chosen via spotting.

24. Referring to his discussions with General Innes, CARPENTER asked what assistance RIBAK could be able to provide his organization in the subversive field. [ ] said he knew little about this subject, but that he would speak with other officers and give CARPENTER some kind of answer before he left the U.S. CARPENTER asked whether there were any persons in Germany or Europe who might be able to give assistance in this field. [ ] said he did not know, but that if RIBAK could help CARPENTER it most certainly would. (Note: Later in the day, [ ] gave CARPENTER essentially the same suggestion on this subject as that given by [ ] in Paragraph 20.) CARPENTER asked what sort of personnel exchange programs existed between the various civilian and military services in the U.S. to enable an understanding of the problems faced by various organizations. [ ] said that RIBAK has an exchange program with the military which has proven very successful, and he discussed the mechanics of this program. [ ] then speaking adjourned at 1:45 and [ ] took CARPENTER to the [ ] home to which had Mahan up for a cocktail party.



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15. At 1500 a cocktail party attended by 25 persons was held in the North Lounge of the Hamilton-Orlison Hotel to introduce CARMICHAEL to members of the RUC, who were visiting Gurney later this summer, and also enable him to visit with persons who had given, or would give him briefings. Conversation at the party was generally innocuous except for an isolated allusion between Langner, however, and [ ] who made reference to CARMICHAEL. The party broke up at 2100 and Langner, CARMICHAEL, [ ] and [ ] adjourned to the "big" bar dinner.

16 June

16. CARMICHAEL spent a quiet day at the [ ] where he relaxed and caught up on his correspondence. In the evening, he, the [ ] and [ ] went to the Grand Hotel for dinner, lounge drinks, and lounge speakers. Names and location are believed to have profited.

17 June

17. CARMICHAEL relaxed at the [ ] In the evening CARMICHAEL, the [ ] drove to the Langner for drinks, cigarettes, and in speaking of CARMICHAEL. Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Foley, Mrs. Langner, and her father were also present.

18 June

18. At 0930 [ ] called for CARMICHAEL at the [ ] home and drove him to the Gurney address where CARMICHAEL was given a quickly conducted all-day tour of the premises, including the laboratory. CARMICHAEL was well escorted by a RUCAR representative and the three men he met at Gurney. However, in the evening CARMICHAEL met [ ] for cocktails and dinner. Details of this meeting are contained in a separate cover attachment to this dispatch.

19 June

19. Gurney took CARMICHAEL to their smoking grounds at quarters for the day where he was given demonstrations in the art of handling firearms. In the evening, after dinner at the [ ] CARMICHAEL, the [ ] and [ ] saw Williams of the Angus Room at the National Theater.

20 June

20. At 1000 CARMICHAEL was introduced to Identity & was invited to his about 40 minutes on the problems concerned in establishing and building up Gurney. No RUCAR representative was present. CARMICHAEL later told [ ] that he found the meeting with Identity & especially stimulating since he hadn't expected such a frank discussion of Identity & its initial problems with Gurney. Identity & apparently stressed the necessity for personal contact with influential persons who can aid a fledgling organization. He indicated that other portions of this dispatch, and [ ] too is a great exponent of the

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wrote of personal contact, and Identity 4's philosophy obviously struck a responsive chord in CARPENTIER. The remainder of the meeting CARPENTIER spent with other CUNNY representatives discussing laws, investigative techniques, and other subjects in common between CUNNY and CARPENTIER's organization.

21. After lunch with CUNNY representatives, CARPENTIER met [ ] and [ ] at the Willard Coffee Lounge where the latter asked about two items which Rudolf HULL has been perfecting in the DEA Workshop laboratory: a device for identifying typewriters, and a device for testing the authenticity of documents. CARPENTIER said that he was certain HULL would be glad to talk to [ ] but that introductions oral or written should probably be made by CARPENTIER. He suggested that [ ] contact him directly or through [ ] come to Germany. The meeting adjourned at 1:30 and [ ] drove CARPENTIER to the [ ] to pick up his suitcase for his trip to New York.

22. At 16:30 CARPENTIER and [ ] at the Union Station where after drinks, CARPENTIER and [ ] boarded the train for New York. On arrival they checked in at the Franklin Hotel. [ ] contacted by Identity 10 of the New York Office of Security who made arrangements to meet them the following evening.

23. June

23. At 08:30 Identity 10 met CARPENTIER and [ ] at the Statler and the group drove to Sing Sing Prison. On arrival at about 1800 they were introduced to Warden Wilfred L. Deane, who gave a running uninterrupted account of the New York Prison system and his theories of prison management. CARPENTIER managed to inject the statement that he had once been intimately involved with prison affairs as Chief prosecutor of Schleming-Bulowitz, but apart from this statement, Deane monopolized the conversation.

24. Deane then called in Sgt. Goldfarb who took the group on a guided tour of the prison, which included the hospital, cell blocks, school, workshops, and death house. CARPENTIER declined an invitation to sit in the electric chair. After lunch in the officers mess and a farewell by Deane, the group returned to New York City. On the return trip, CARPENTIER discussed the RESEARCH case with [ ] and stated essentially the same facts as those in paragraph 10. CARPENTIER emphasized that the CIL was created solely to assist the allies in Berlin on security matters but cannot act independently nor has it any real authority. In response to a question by [ ] as to the relationship between Identity 5 and Identity 6, CARPENTIER said that Identity 6 comprises substantially with Identity 5 and Identity 7 and furthermore is required to submit monthly reports on activities to Identity 5. Such procedure provides Identity 5 with an additional check on Identity 6. In the evening [ ] took CARPENTIER to a restaurant for dinner and then to the film "The Prisoner".

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28 June

35. At 0930 CARRUTHERS and [ ] were met by Identity 11 of the New York office, Office of Security, and escorted to the headquarters of the New York Police Department where they were introduced to their escort for the day, LA. CRANE, Chief of the Special Services Unit of the Detective Division. (The Special Services Unit is responsible for the protection of dignitaries visiting New York City and for subversive matters in the New York area including CP activities and labor subversion.) CRANE introduced CARRUTHERS and [ ] to Chief Inspector Maggett and the group toured the communications center of the Manhattan Borough.

36. Later the group went to CRANE's office where they discussed cooperation between the New York Police Department and US government agencies in CP matters in the New York area. CRANE then called in LA. RAVENSON and the group drove to the headquarters of the air and maritime unit at the Battery. They inspected a helicopter and returned to police headquarters where they met Police Commissioner Kennedy. The conversation turned to Harry Goldmann of the International Police, under whom Kennedy had studied. CARRUTHERS asked Kennedy whether he knew that Goldmann came to London from New York in connection with the GAMBELLA case because Goldmann knew Identity 8 personally. Kennedy knew nothing about this relationship. The GAMBELLA case was discussed briefly and CARRUTHERS observed that GAMBELLA must be brought to trial to demonstrate to the public that a man in GAMBELLA's position cannot escape prosecution for treacherable acts. Kennedy and CARRUTHERS then discussed the application of scientific and technical means to criminal investigation.

37. After lunch the group returned to the police dock at the Battery and boarded a police boat for a two hour cruise around Manhattan. In the evening, [ ] and CARRUTHERS stopped at the Rainbow Room for cocktails where they discussed the KILMER & HILFMAN case. Nothing unusual was related except that for a period during the development of the case, CARRUTHERS suspected that the case officer might be [ ] CARRUTHERS commented that he felt the case gave the Army a black eye. CARRUTHERS again brought up the subject of the capabilities of the Navy in this field. CRANE mentioned playing a radio in a counter measure to which CARRUTHERS replied that this was correct if the radio was playing voices, and not music, for the latter according to CARRUTHERS can be filtered out. Asked what SPEARS was doing in the Radio Field, CARRUTHERS replied that they were doing such as audio-surveillance equipment, but little with detection equipment.

29 June

38. At 0930 CARRUTHERS and [ ] were met by Identity 10 of the Security Office who drove them around Manhattan to see the Battery, Chinatown, Harlem, Spanish Harlem, and some of the smaller areas of the city. After

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lunch at Jager's, they returned to the hotel where CARPENTER sought up on his sleep. In the evening, CARPENTER and [ ] had cocktails and dinner at the Otterbein Hotel and listened to the money matters heard. CARPENTER remarked that in a way he dreaded returning to his office because so much will have piled up in his absence and because he will have to prepare a report on his trip to the United States, where he has acquired many new ideas which he must discuss and implement. He praised the ways welcome he received in this country and said that he felt his trip was a real success. He added that he favors casual or semi-casual trips of this sort for himself or other top members of his staff. CARPENTER said that he was having lunch the next day with a relative of one of his staff members, but apart from that engagement, he intended to rest. On the 6th he was to be escorted by a representative of the Office of Security on a tour of the United Nations Headquarters. In the late afternoon he was to drive to Identia Airfield with Identity 10 and depart for Germany at 1900.

39. In retrospect, we believe that CARPENTER found his stay in the U.S. to be worthwhile and, we hope, pleasant. He received a much wider reception than we had initially hoped for, including, as you will note, talks with the Chief of CHERRY and General G. S. Kristine. Such receptions were of course not without purpose, and Ruddy may find that any thoughts of a form of controlled U.S. liaison to CARPENTER's office will probably need revision. CARPENTER himself indicated that he prefers to talk directly to the persons or organization most informed on a specific case.

40. Before CARPENTER left Washington, [ ] explained the role which KIRAN played in securing a scholarship for his son, since CARPENTER gave no indication that he knew of KIRAN's representation with Identity 9. CARPENTER was surprised at the information and remarked that he had not wanted [ ] to go to such lengths to secure the scholarship. Last CARPENTER from any false notions about Identity 9. [ ] explained its history and said that only because a KIRAN representative knew the director of the organization, and CARPENTER's son qualified for the scholarship, were we able to make the arrangements. He hesitated to speculate on CARPENTER's overall reaction to the information about KIRAN's role in the scholarship, but CARPENTER probably regards our assistance as a token of goodwill rather than a hassle for control. He is, we feel, a man of high ethics which he wears well. Indistinctive of such in his matter-of-fact statement to Glywood that he and his family lived completely on the official rations during the period 1945 to 1948 when almost nobody in Germany did so.

41. CARPENTER is certainly the type and caliber of person for whom all the work which goes into U.S. briefing and tour arrangements seems worthwhile. More than once CARPENTER remarked about his close working relationship with Ruddy for whom he has the greatest esteem, and in whose capabilities he

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new confidence. We hope that this attitude, together with continued willingness toward cooperation which CHRISTENSEN displayed while in the U.S., will be reflected in the future working relationship between CHRISTENSEN, the men under him, and EISENH and other U.S. agencies in Germany. We can also hope that CHRISTENSEN remains at the helm of his organization for many years to come.

26 July 1956

2 Enclosures: (under separate cover)

1. Identities
2. Memorandum for the Record

Distribution:

- 3 - Bonn w/3 copies of each enclosure
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Separate Cover Enclosure to RMB-495

9 Aug 56

Identity 1 - **SPYMASTER**

Identity 2 - ☐

Identity 3 - **Real Name SCHWARTZ-STEINACK**

Identity 4 - **Mr. John Edgar Hoover**

Identity 5 - **The NSA**

Identity 6 - **The NSA**

Identity 7 - **The CIA**

Identity 8 - **Unlabeled DOCUMENT**

Identity 9 - **The American Field Service**

Identity 10 - ☐

Identity 11 - **Mr. Brown**

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Separate Cover Enclosure to JUNE-30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with CAUFEMAN

1. As requested, I met CAUFEMAN in company with [ ] CAUFEMAN, [ ] in the evening of Monday, 15 June 1956. I joined [ ] at a few minutes after 6:00 P.M. and stayed with them through a subsequent dinner at Harvey's Apartment on Connecticut Avenue and a nightcap at [ ] house. All in all I spent approximately five hours with CAUFEMAN. CAUFEMAN had been briefed by [ ] that he would meet me and had been told that I was interested in German affairs. I met CAUFEMAN under my true name.

2. The evening conversations with CAUFEMAN ranged over a wide field including the general situation in Germany, German literature and music, food, and intelligence matters. The latter point was first touched upon when I asked CAUFEMAN as to the value of his present trip. He stated that he was overwhelmed by the program that had been laid on for him and that it opened his eyes to the great deficiencies which existed in the West German internal security structure. He said finally that he is dissatisfied with it and that Germany would have to go a long way until a satisfactory situation could be achieved. I replied that I was well aware of the problems facing him and others responsible for internal security since it had been one of my responsibilities to assist in the establishment of the LRV, Bvards. This led naturally into a discussion of the RY and the question to what the RY had recovered from the "John affair." CAUFEMAN replied that the "John affair" was such a heavy mortgage on the RY that the whole house may have to be put up for forced sale (he used the word *zwangsversteigerung*). He explained later on that he did not think of the abolishment of the RY but of a radical internal reorganization not only personnel-wise but also of its legal basis. In particular he feels that the federal structure and the present relationship between the RY and the LRV is untenable. He called it "bismarckian." In his opinion, communist subversion in any given country cannot be effectively countered or neutralized by a number of basically independent offices since the communist movement is world wide and centrally directed. As matters stand at the present time there is nothing to stop the lowest case officer in the B variant LRV to keep to himself the running of an operation against a hostile intelligence agent if he or his superiors do not desire to ask advice or guidance from the RY or SO. He further criticized that personnel selections of LRV personnel in principle based on each personnel's political assessments by the respective head governments. Following this thought further, CAUFEMAN feels that particularly the LRV's have in too many instances been used for party political purposes. Another contributing factor to the unsatisfactory status of the German internal security situation is the fact that the three

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western allies have tried and partially succeeded in selling their respective systems to the West Germans without, however, pointing out what the drawbacks of these systems are. Compounding this, no centralized study has been made by the Federal Republic to establish a list of criteria geared to the specific West German situation and then evolve an internal security system which meets these requirements. Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, CARPENTIER stated that the RIV should have been established at about the time that it was but should have waited for the first three years as he put it for fun. With this he meant that the RIV should not have been expected to achieve tangible results but that this should have been a training period which would have given the personnel an opportunity to learn to know and work with each other and to eliminate the difficulties as have occurred. In fact his proposal is similar to the way in which is standard procedure for anybody who intends to publish a new newspaper or magazine.

3. Regarding Otto John, CARPENTIER stated that his selection as President of the RIV was most unfortunate and the clearest example of the malfunction of a screening procedure which relies entirely on files and papers. It is his judgment that a half hour discussion between the then Federal Minister of the Interior and Otto John would have shown conclusively that John was unsuitable for proposed position. CARPENTIER characterized John as an unstable personality, emotionally unbalanced, incapable of having a normal relationship with the other sex (all such relationships were with women considerably older than John), having a streak of playboy but at the same time a driving ambition for high positions. In pursuing this further I got CARPENTIER to expound the following theory. John felt the necessity to strengthen his rather insecure position as President of the RIV by going into the East Sector of Berlin. He used Dr. Vollgaumth for this purpose and fully expected to be able to return to the West Sector the same evening. CARPENTIER states that Vollgaumth was trying to lure Dr. John into the East on behalf of the RIV. He also thinks that the East Germans never had any plan for the exploitation of John and that John returned to the West when he finally became aware of this fact. Concerning Vollgaumth, CARPENTIER ventured the guess that Vollgaumth may return to the West to testify on the events of the evening of 20 July 1954 and, while I did not press him on this point, I had the impression that West German authorities may be engaged in offering a safe conduct to Vollgaumth. This feeling on my part was enhanced when CARPENTIER informed me in answer to a question that no arrest warrant was or is outstanding against Vollgaumth. While CARPENTIER was completely open in discussing the general internal security situation in Germany, he was definitely reserved in discussing the details of the present status of the John case. Since I did not want to give the impression of being officially concerned with the John case, I did not pursue it further when I observed CARPENTIER's sensitivity on this score.

4. I found CARPENTIER an extremely pleasant person to talk to. To the extent that he revealed himself during this evening I would describe him as a typical example of a German civil servant in the best sense of the word.

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He is a man of wide interests with a thorough appreciation of world literature and music, open minded toward other nations with an unquestionable adherence to the values of what the Germans call the Christian Abrahamic. Typical for him is the stress which he laid upon, without it being an empty boast, that he and his family lived completely on the official ration during the period 1945 to 1946 when almost nobody in Germany did so. He is unashamedly grateful to all the opportunities which KUBARK has afforded him during his visits here in 1974 and 1976 but I do not judge that anything we could do for him would ever be enough of an inducement to forget the oath that he swore as a German civil servant. In short, CARMICHAEL constitutes a valuable liaison asset who will go a long way to assist us professionally and discuss professional matters, but who could not be recruited as an agent. Conversely, his relationship with us would suffer considerably or would cease altogether if he would switch to that we are not dealing honestly with him, not to speak of if he would uncover operations which we are running against the West German government.

[REDACTED]

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